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Headquarters
AIR RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

RDGN

16 May 1960

Samos "Early Fix" Facility at Omaha (C)

RDG (General Schriever)

1. A meeting was held in the Pentagon on 13 May at the request of Dr. Charyk to discuss factors which would lead to a decision to approve the D&F for the subject facility. In attendance were Dr. Charyk, General Walsh, Colonel Harry Evans, Major Weinberg, Colonel John Martin and Major Howard (AFDAT), and the undersigned.

2. It appears that Dr. Charyk did not feel that he had sufficient information to approve the D&F for $268,000 to install equipment and make appropriate modifications of space in the old Martin bomber plant at Offutt. He therefore requested a briefing and a discussion on this subject and requested AFDAT to make the arrangements.

3. The background of the Samos program was reviewed and these pertinent items were emphasized:

a. The TRW facility at Denver is basically designed to provide for test evaluation and model improvement of the experimental and prototype equipment for Subsystem I and is not available for operational use.

b. The concept for the "Early Fix" facility at Omaha is to provide for taking all useful intelligence data from the R&D Samos launch operations and reducing it to useful photographic intelligence.

c. It is not possible to define the level of R&D effort required to fully accomplish the operational requirements for Samos because the operations plan is not firm nor has it been approved.

d. Subsystem I equipment going into TRW, Denver, is scheduled for initial operations in September 1960 and the facility should have completed initial R&D test and evaluation of Subsystem I by March 1961.

e. "Early Fix" capability at Omaha is planned for 5 September 1960 (the first Samos is to be launched 10 September).

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2. General Walsh stated that the "Early Fix" capability is intended to phase ultimately into the fully operational Subsystem I.

3. Dr. Charyk hesitated to agree to the approval of the D&F because he felt that the concept of employing the "Early Fix" facility as a phase into the fully operational subsystem might be questioned because of its susceptibility to destruction by ballistic missiles. After a lengthy discussion, the general conclusion was that Samos is a pre-strike, not a post-strike, system and therefore hardening does not appear logical.

4. General Walsh made the following statements. He felt that ARDC is not attempting to cooperate with him in providing for the very earliest transition from R&D to operational phase for the Samos Subsystem I. He was counting on getting equipment into Omaha by March of 61 out of the TRW facility at Denver, and he stated that in a December BMC meeting, the Commander, ARDC, agreed that this equipment could be made available for movement to Omaha. Since none of us could confirm that March 61 was an agreed to date for the transfer of this equipment, or that the equipment transfer would not indeed harm continued R&D capability, he felt that he must ascertain whether or not the Commander, in fact, intends to agree to transfer of selected equipments from Denver to Omaha. He stated categorically that if the equipment is operable in March, it should then be moved to Omaha and used in an operational mode.

5. Colonel Evans and I stated that we would like to present to General Walsh a more detailed account of what is being accomplished at TRW, Denver, indicate what the R&D program consists of, and what effect the transfer of some selected equipments from Denver to Omaha would have on our R&D capability. We stressed the fact that it is preferable to procure operational equipment for operations, not use R&D prototypes. He did not seem to agree to these points. Colonel Evans is attempting to work out a future briefing on this for General Walsh. Dr. Charyk concluded the meeting by stating that he would look over the matter of approving the D&F on the "Early Fix" facility later in the afternoon. He did not make any positive commitment that he would approve it. He further concluded that System 465L makes no sense to him if the Samos Subsystem I is in a soft configuration.

6. It is quite clear that General Walsh feels that ARDC is not fully cooperative and in agreement with his ideas concerning the development and use of reconnaissance and intelligence equipment. It is possible that you may get a call from him on this matter.

SIGNED

NORMAN C. APPOLD
Colonel, USAF
Special Asst. for ARPA/NASA
Affairs

cc: Colonel Harry Evans, AFBMD
Colonel J. A. Martin, AFDAT





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